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The quantum key distribution protocol without public announcement of bases is equipped with a
two-way classical communication symmetric entanglement purification protocol. This modified key
distribution protocol is unconditionally secure and has a higher tolerable error rate of 20%, which
is higher than previous scheme without public announcement of bases.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk,03.65.Ud,03.67.Dd,03.67.-a
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the most
important and exciting fields in quantum information.
Its basic idea is to make use of principles in quantum
mechanics to detect whether there exists an eavesdrop-
per Eve, when two parties, Alice and Bob use quantum
channel to perform key distribution. In this way, the se-
curity is much higher than that with only classical com-
munications. The earliest QKD protocol was proposed
by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84)[1]. It is a kind
of prepare-and-measure QKD protocol, a protocol that
Alice first prepares a sequence of single photons, and she
sends them to Bob who measures each single photon im-
mediately after receiving it. Such kind of protocols are
much more practical because they do not require quan-
tum computation and quantum memory.
The security of QKD protocols is a basic problem in
quantum information. BB84 protocol has been proved to
be secure when the channels are noiseless. However, it
is until recently that its unconditional security has been
proved. Mayers[2] and Biham[3] presented their proofs,
but the proofs are rather complex. In Mayers’ proof,
BB84 protocol is secure when the error rate of the chan-
nel is less than about 7%. Shor and Preskill[4] gave a
much simpler proof which guarantees the unconditional
security of BB84 protocol if the error rate is less than
about 11%. And then, Gottesman and Lo[5] brought
two-way classical communications to BB84 protocol, and
obtained a much higher tolerable error rate, 18.9%, which
makes sure that the BB84 protocol with two-way classical
communications is unconditional secure. Recently, Chau
has presented a secure QKD scheme making use of an
adaptive privacy amplification procedure with two-way
classical communications whenever the bit error rate is
less than 20.0%[6].
It is known that the standard BB84 protocol will use
only half of the transmitted qubits for key distribution.
In order to enhance the efficiency of the standard BB84
protocol, many variations have been proposed. BB84
without public announcement of basis (PAB) is just such
a protocol[7]. In the eavesdropping detection process
of standard BB84, Alice announces her basis string in
which the qubit string is prepared, only after Bob has
finished receiving and measuring the qubit string. This
announcement step is called public announcement of ba-
sis(PAB). PAB guarantees Alice and Bob to select the
same measurement basis without eavesdropping. How-
ever it also leads to waste of average one half of the
qubits. In BB84 without PAB, the communication par-
ties do not need PAB; instead, they agree on a secret
random measurement basis sequence before any steps of
standard BB84. Alice encodes qubits according to the
prior basis sequence, and Bob uses the same basis se-
quence to measure the qubits when he receives them. In
this way, none of the measurement results will be dropped
as a result of Alice and Bob choosing different measuring-
basis. BB84 without PAB, therefore, is still a prepare-
and-measure QKD. In the information processing of this
protocol, Eve knows little about the secret prior basis se-
quence yet, so all attacking strategies that she can use are
still the same as those in standard BB84. As a result, the
security of BB84 without PAB in noiseless channels can
be derived easily from the proof of the noiseless security
of standard BB84.
In this paper, we concentrate on the security of BB84
without PAB and its tolerable error rate. The proto-
col has been proved to be secure through noisy channels
following Shor and Preskill’s method[8] which obtains a
tolerable error rate of 11%, the same as that of standard
BB84[4]. Recently, two-way classical communications are
introduced in security proof and it increases the tolera-
ble error rate of standard BB84 to 18.9%[5] and 20%[6]
respectively. Inspired by this new idea, we prove the se-
curity of BB84 without PAB with two-way classical com-
munications. We first describe the notations in this paper
in sectionII. In section III, we present a QKD protocol
without PAB and with a two-way entanglement purifi-
cation protocol(2-EPP), and prove its security. Then we
use a theorem in section IV to reduce the protocol into a
prepare-and-measure protocol, that is, the BB84 without
PAB and with two-way classical communications, and
gives a detailed example in section V to obtain its mini-
mal tolerable error rate of 20%. We give a brief summary
in section VI.
2II. NOTATIONS
The notations in this paper are mostly the same as
those in Gottesman and Lo’s paper[5]. A Pauli operator
acting on n qubits is a n-dimension tensor product of
individual qubit operators that are of the following forms:
I(the identity), X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
Y =
(
0 −i
i 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
. (1)
Note that X , Y and Z operators are anti-commutative
with each other, and all the Pauli operators have only
eigenvalues +1 and -1.
Bell bases are the four maximally entangled states
Ψ± =
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉),Φ± = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉). (2)
A symmetric EPP can be described with a set of opera-
tors {Mµ} plus unitary decoding operations Uµ⊗(PµUµ),
where Pµ is a Pauli operator. Each Mµ is a particular
measurement step of the protocol with the index µ which
denotes a measurement history sequence in which each
bit is 0 or 1 based on the outcome of the corresponding
measurement step. According to the history sequence µ,
Alice and Bob should both choose the same operatorMµ
to do measurement and this is why the EPP is called
symmetric. Uµ ⊗ (PµUµ) is error correcting operations
depending on µ after they obtain all error syndromes.
Alice performs Uµ while Bob performs PµUµ operation.
In various symmetric EPPs, there exist a set of the
EPPs in which all measurementsMµ are of eigenspaces of
Pauli operators, and the decoding operator Uµ is a Clif-
ford group operator, and the error-correcting operator
Pµ is a Pauli operator. This set of symmetric EPPs are
called stabilizer EPPs. And if all measurements Mµ of a
stabilizer EPP are either X-type (including only I and X
operators) or Z-type(including only I and Z operators),
and Uµ involves only CNOTs, this stabilizer EPP is called
a Calderbank-Shor-Steane-like EPP(CSS-like EPP). The
CSS-like property comes from the idea of CSS code which
decouples the error-correction of X and Z and guarantees
the reduction in Shor and Preskill’s proof of BB84[4]. Be-
low, all the EPPs are CSS-like unless noted explicitly. In
CSS-code CSS(C1, C2) is constructed from two classical
linear codes C1 and C2 that encodes k1 bit and k2 bits of
codewords into n-bits codewords, and C2 ⊂ C1 and C1
and C⊥2 both correct t errors.
In EPP with one-way classical communications(1-
EPP), Alice does not know the measurement results of
Bob and can not obtain the history sequence µ. There-
fore, all the measurements and operations in 1-EPP are
independent to µ. However in EPP with two-way classi-
cal communications(2-EPP), Bob can also tell Alice his
measurement results through classical channels, so the
communication parties can make use of history sequence
µ and choose proper measurement operator according to
the current history, and the final decoding and error-
correcting operations also vary with the measurement re-
sults. In this way, 2-EPP are supposed to tolerate higher
error rate than 1-EPP, and we will show that introduc-
ing two-way classical communications indeed increases
the tolerable error rate for BB84 without PAB.
III. THE QKD WITH 2-EPP WITHOUT PAB
In this section, we present a QKD protocol with 2-
EPP without PAB, and prove its security through noisy
channels.
Protocol 1: QKD with 2-EPP without PAB
1. Alice and Bob share a secret random (2n/r) bit
string, and repeat it r times to form a basis se-
quence b.
2. Alice prepares 2n EPR pairs in the state (Φ+)⊗2n,
and applies a Hadamard transformation to the sec-
ond qubit of each EPR pair where the correspond-
ing bit of the basis sequence b is 1.
3. Alice sends the second half of each EPR pairs to
Bob.
4. Bob receives the qubits, and publicly announces the
reception.
5. Alice randomly chooses n pairs of the 2n EPR pairs
as check bits to check the interference of Eve.
6. Alice broadcasts the positions of the check EPR
pairs.
7. Bob applies a Hadamard transformation to the
qubits where the corresponding bit of the basis se-
quence b is 1.
8. Alice and Bob both measure their own halves of
the n check EPR pairs on the Z basis, and pub-
licly compare the results. If there are too many
disagreements, they abort the protocol.
9. Alice and Bob apply 2-EPP to the remaining n
EPR pairs, and then share a state with high fidelity
to (Φ+)m.
10. Alice and Bob measure the state in the Z basis to
obtain a shared secret key.
In protocol 1, the idea of QKD without PAB is ap-
plied in step 1, 2 and 7. Alice and Bob share a basis
sequence b at the beginning. They can first distribute
a smaller random sequence with bit length 2n/r by an-
other QKD protocol or other methods, then repeat it r
times. Although the basis sequence b is a repeat of a
random string, if r is small and n is large enough, the
information of the base sequence of Eve is still exponen-
tially small for n, and the effect of r is only to increase
3the information of the base sequence of Eve by multiply-
ing polynomial of r. Therefore, we can affirm that Eve
knows very little about the basis sequence.
Knowing that Eve knows very little about b, we can
follow the method of Gottesman and Lo[5] to derive the
unconditional security of protocol 1. First, protocol 1
is based on stabilizer EPP, hence the quantum channel
is equivalent to a Pauli channel. Furthermore, because
all operators in protocol 1 commute to each other, we
can apply classical probability analysis. Calculating the
probability of the success of error-correcting, because Eve
knows little about the basis sequence, we find that the
fidelity of the state shared by Alice and Bob after EPP to
(Φ+)⊗m is 1−2−s for a large factor s[4]. By lemma 1 and
lemma 2 in [9], Eve’s mutual information with the final
key is less than 2−c + 2O(−2s) where c = s − log2(2m +
s+1/ ln 2). As a result, Eve’s information about the final
key is exponentially small and the unconditional security
of protocol 1 is proved.
IV. BB84 WITH TWO-WAY CLASSICAL
COMMUNICATIONS WITHOUT PAB
Protocol 1 is based on EPP which requires quantum
computers to process. In this section, we will reduce pro-
tocol 1 to a prepare-and-measure protocol, that is, BB84
with two-way classical communications without PAB(2-
BB84 without PAB). The equivalent reduction of proto-
col 1 is based on the main theorem of Gottesman and
Lo[5]. We revise it in a more simple way and apply it to
protocol 1 as the following.
Theorem 1 (Revised Main Theorem in [5])
Suppose a 2-EPP is CSS-like and also satisfies the
following conditions:
1. If Mµ is X-type operators for a specific step with µ,
for the following step with µ′( µ′ = µ0 or µ1), the
choose of Mµ′ is independent of the measurement
result of Mµ, that is Mµ0 = Mµ1.
2. The final decoding operations Uµ can depend ar-
bitrarily on the outcome of the measured Z-type
operators, but cannot depend on the outcomes of
measured X-type operators at all. The correction
operation Pµ can depend on the outcome of X-type
operators, but only by factors of Z.
Then protocol 1 can be converted to a prepare-and-
measure QKD without PAB scheme with the same se-
curity.
The first condition in theorem 1 is equivalent to the
tree diagram representation of the first condition of the
main theorem in [5]. If Alice and Bob drop the phase-
error, they do not know the exact result of the phase-
error. In order to continue the 2-EPP, they must choose
the unique measurement operator in the next step despite
of the X-type measurement outcome. The existence of
the two condition guarantees this statement. And a CSS-
like EPP makes that the corrections of bit-flip errors and
phase-flip errors are separated. So Alice and Bob can
perform only bit-flip error correction and do not require
quantum computers to correct phase-flip errors.
In detail, the first step is to throw away X-basis op-
erations and measurements. The introduction of QKD
without PAB in protocol 1 affects only in step 1 to 7,
before the error correction and privacy amplification. It
only modifies the choice of base sequence, and when the
EPP is proceeded, all particles are in the Z-basis. There-
fore, the transformation of 2-EPP quantum circuit in[5]
can be directly applied. After the transformation, Alice
and Bob can obtain a classical circuit with measurements
only in Z-basis.
The second step is to transform the protocol into a
prepare-and-measure QKD. Following the same idea in
[4], because all operations in protocol 1 commute with
each other, it is not necessary for Alice to prepare and
distribute EPR pairs and then measure them. Instead,
Alice can measure them before distribution. In other
words, Alice can just prepare a random binary string,
and encode it into qubits, and send them to Bob. Also,
Bob can measure the qubits in the basis according to
the basis sequence immediately after he receives them,
instead of using quantum memory to store the qubits.
Thus, we can successfully transform protocol 1 into a
prepare-and-measure QKD without PAB.
In the final step, in order to simplify the protocol, Alice
and Bob can perform 2-EPP to reduce the error rate of
the qubits until both bit-flip and phase-flip errors are
lower than the bound of the capacity of 1-EPP. Then
they can perform 1-EPP to correct the remaining error
and obtain the final secret key[5].
Consequently, we can conclude the content above into
protocol 2 as the following.
Protocol 2: Secure BB84 with two-way classical com-
munications without PAB
1. Alice and Bob share a secret random (2n/r) bit
string, and repeat it r times to form a basis se-
quence b.
2. Alice prepares 2n random qubits, measure each
qubit in Z-basis which the corresponding bit of b is
0 or in X-basis which the corresponding bit of b is
1. So Alice obtain an random key and encode it in
the qubit string.
3. Alice sends the qubit string to Bob.
4. Bob receives these 2n qubit string, measures it in
Z-basis orX-basis according to b, and then publicly
acknowledges the receipt.
5. Alice randomly chooses n qubits as check bits and
announces their positions.
6. Alice and Bob compare the measurement results of
the check bits. if there are too many errors, they
abort the protocol.
47. Alice and Bob use a classical circuit transformed
from 2-EPP to do error-correction until the error
rates of both bit and phase are lower than the
bound of the capacity of BB84 with one-way clas-
sical communications, for example 11% in [4].
8. Alice and Bob use the method in BB84 with
one-way classical communications to perform final
error-correction and privacy amplification to obtain
the key. For example, they can use CSS Code to
correct errors, and obtain the coset ν + C2 as the
secret key[4].
According to theorem 1, protocol 2 is equivalent to
protocol 1. Therefore protocol 2 is also unconditional
secure through noisy channels.
V. AN EXAMPLE OF SECURE BB84 WITH
TWO-WAY CLASSICAL COMMUNICATIONS
AND WITHOUT PAB
In section III, we give the secure BB84 with two-way
classical communications without PAB, that is protocol
2. However, protocol 2 is still a theoretic scheme, and
needs further study to exploit its capacity. In this section,
a particular 2-EPP from [5] is presented and transformed
to the classical circuit. We use this classical circuit in step
7 of protocol 2 so that we can estimate the lower bound
of the tolerable error rate of protocol 2.
Although the theorem 1 guarantees the security of pro-
tocol 2, it is still necessary to find a practical 2-EPP that
fulfills the theorem’s conditions. Such a 2-EPP is pre-
sented in [5] induced from the classical error-correction
theory. This 2-EPP contains alternating rounds of two
major steps, that is, bit-flip error-correction step(“B
step”) and phase-flip error-correction(“P step”) step:
B step[5]: Alice and Bob randomly permute all the
EPR pairs.Then they each measure their own local Z⊗Z
in order to obtain the bit-flip error of the remaining out-
put pair. If the results of Alice and Bob are different, they
estimate that there is a bit flip on the remaining output
pair, and discard it. This step is similar to advantage
distillation in classical communications by Maurer[10].
P step[5]: Alice and Bob randomly permute all the
EPR pairs. Then they group them into sets of three,
both measure X1X2 and X1X3 on each set. This step
can be transformed into a circuit that first perform a
Hadamard transformation on each qubit, two bilateral
XORs, measurement of the last two EPR pairs, and a
final Hadamard transform. If Alice and Bob disagree on
one measurement, Bob estimates that the phase error was
probably on the first two EPR pairs and does nothing; if
both measurements disagree, Bob assumes the phase er-
ror was on the third EPR pair and corrects it by perform-
ing a Z gate. This step is induced from 3-qubit phase-flip
error correcting code, and will reduce the phase-flip error
rate if the error rate is low enough.
The completed 2-EPP consists of alternating rounds of
the two steps above. In each round, Alice and Bob first
perform a B step to calculate bit-flip error syndromes.
This is a Z-type measurement step. Then Alice and Bob
perform a P step to calculate phase-flip error syndromes,
which is a X-type measurement step. And P step does
not affect later operations. So the 2-EPP satisfies the
conditions of theorem 1. After P step, they estimate
the error rate of the qubits by sacrificing some of them
to measure. If the error rate is lower than the bound
of BB84 with one-way classical communication, that is,
about 11%, they use Shor and Preskill’s method to obtain
final key[4], otherwise, they go on with another round of
B and P steps.
By transforming the circuit of the 2-EPP according
to theorem 1, we can get a more detailed protocol than
protocol 2 as the following.
Protocol 3: secure BB84 example with two-way classi-
cal communications without PAB
1. Alice and Bob share a secret random (2n/r) bit
string, and repeat it r times to form a basis se-
quence b.
2. Alice prepares 2n random qubits, measure each
qubit in Z-basis in which the corresponding bit of b
is 0 or in X-basis in which the corresponding bit of
b is 1. So Alice obtains an random key and encodes
it in the qubit string.
3. Alice sends the qubit string to Bob.
4. Bob receives these 2n qubit string, measures it in
Z-basis orX-basis according to b, and then publicly
acknowledges the receipt.
5. Alice randomly chooses n qubits as check bits and
announces their positions.
6. Alice and Bob compare the measurement results of
the check bits. If there are too many errors, they
abort the protocol.
7. (B step)Alice and Bob randomly pair up their own
bits. Alice publicly announces the parity(XOR) of
the values of each pair of her own, that is, x2i−1 ⊕
x2i, and Bob also publicly announces the parity of
his corresponding pair, that is, y2i−1 ⊕ y2i. If the
parities agree, they keep one of the bits of the pair.
Otherwise, they discard the whole pair.
8. (P step)Alice and Bob randomly group the remain-
ing bits in to sets of three, and compute the parity
of each set. They now regard those parities as their
effective new bits in later steps.
9. Alice and Bob sacrifice sufficient m of the new bit
pairs to perform the refined data analysis publicly.
They abort if the error rate is too large. And if the
error rate is low enough, they go to the next step,
otherwise, they return to step 7.
510. Alice and Bob randomly permute their pairs, and
use Shor and Preskill method[4] with one-way
classical communications to perform final error-
correction and privacy amplification. In detail, it
contains the following sub-steps:
1) Alice and Bob select a proper CSS(C1,C2)
Code Q.
2) Alice randomly choose a codeword u from clas-
sical linear code C1, and announces u + v,
where v is a remaining code bits.
3) Bob subtracts u+ v from his code bits, v + ǫ,
and obtains u + ǫ, and then corrects it to a
codeword w in C1.
4) Because code C2 in CSS Code Q is a subgroup
of Fn2 which is the binary vector space on n
bits[11], and u − w ∈ C2, Alice and Bob use
the coset of u+ C2 as the final key.
Protocol 3 consists of detailed operations of each step,
which can be studied further, for example, the tolerable
error rate. Reviewing the discussion in this section, the
introduction of QKD without PAB does not affect the
error-correction and privacy amplification of protocol 3.
Thus, we can estimate the tolerable error rate of our pro-
tocol without PAB directly from the same method in [5]
and [6]. Firstly, from [5], in BB84, the 2-EPP by alternat-
ing B and P steps is successful provided that the bit error
rate is lower than 17.9%. Hence, protocol 3 is secure with
the same upper bound of error rate. However, Gottesman
and Lo point out that alternating B and P steps is not
optimal, and based on other arrangements of such two
steps, the BB84 can achieve higher tolerable error rate
of 18.9%[5]. Moreover, by applying adaptive privacy am-
plification procedure with two-way classical communica-
tions in Gottesman and Lo’s method, Chau obtain that
tolerable error rate of BB84 scheme is 20.0%[6]. Such
modifications in error correcting and privacy amplifica-
tion procedure can also be applied to our BB84 proto-
col with two-way classical communications and without
PAB. In conclusion, our protocol is secure whenever the
bit error rate is less than 20.0%, which is higher than the
result of BB84 with only one-way classical communica-
tions and without Pab[8].
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have proved the unconditional secu-
rity of simple modification of standard BB84 protocol—
BB84 without public announcement of bases, by apply-
ing two-way classical communications. In addition, we
present a detailed protocol, protocol 3, and follow other
2-EPP procedures[5, 6] to calculate a lower bound of
the tolerable error rate of the protocol. The result of
about 20.0% demonstrates advantages of two-way clas-
sical communications over one-way classical communica-
tions without PAB whose tolerable error rate is about
11%[8]. Compared to the previous BB84 protocol sets,
this protocol benefits from both two-way classical com-
munications which tolerate higher error rate and the
technique without PAB which increases key generation
rate. As a result, it is much more efficient than previ-
ous protocols, and can be widely used in future quantum
communications.
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